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RESURRECTING A SUNKEN SHIP: AN





HE tort of public disclosure of private fact' was officially recognizedTby the American Law Institute in 1976 as one of the four types of
invasion of privacy. 2 The promulgation of section 652D of the Re-
statement (Second) of Torts came more than eighty years after Samuel War-
ren and Louis Brandeis first propounded the idea in their famous 1890
article.3  The ALI's adoption of section 652D comported with a trend in
recognizing privacy interests and provided such additional impetus that all
but a handful of states now recognize the public disclosure tort.4 Thus, lia-
bility ostensibly results from giving publicity to a matter that is private,
highly offensive, and not of legitimate concern to the public. While courts
have nominally acknowledged the existence of the tort, they have done little
to give it practical effect. 5 Courts have instead used a variety of theories in
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I. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977) [hereinafter cited as RE-
STATEMENT] defines the tort of public disclosure of private fact as follows:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning the private life of another is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of privacy, if the matter publicized is
one of a kind that
(a) would be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and
(b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.
2. The four types of invasion of privacy are:
(a) unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another;
(b) appropriation of the other's name or likeness;
(c) unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life; and
(d) publicity that unreasonably places the other in a false light before the
public.
RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652A(2).
3. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
4. For one writer's count, see Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to
Warren and Brandeis's Privacy Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 291, 365-66 (1983).
5. The courts historically have been reluctant to acknowledge privacy claims. In early
cases, courts felt compelled to use other theories when they wanted to rule in favor of plaintiffs.
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deciding public disclosure cases, all with the net effect and seeming purpose
of circumventing the public disclosure tort.
Some courts and writers have suggested that this development is inevita-
ble, if not necessary. One court has asserted that "[t]here are some shocks,
inconveniences and annoyancies [sic] which members of society in the nature
of things must absorb without the right of redress,"' 6 including occasional
affronts to their seclusion. A recent article laments that "many of the most
important aspects of human relationships are beyond the reach of the law
and must work themselves out in the imprecise laboratory of manners and
mores."' 7 That article characterizes public disclosure problems as "impervi-
ous to legal solution" and concludes that "it is probably time to admit de-
feat, give up the efforts at resuscitation, and lay the noble experiment in the
instant creation of common law to a well-deserved rest." 8
This Article digests and critically evaluates the various methods that
courts have developed in deciding public disclosure cases. The conclusion is
that the courts, while paying lip service to the public disclosure tort, allow
recovery in only very limited circumstances, that they are unduly conserva-
tive in their handling of these cases, and that a better approach would be to
employ a more general test that would supersede the theories currently used.
This conclusion takes issue with the position that public disclosure problems
are impervious to legal solution and asserts that the test proposed can create
a sensible degree of protection from unreasonable publicity. Part I of the
Article describes and analyzes the six categories that courts use in deciding
these cases; Part II summarizes the current state of the law; Part III pro-
poses a general test to replace the current categories; and Part IV offers some
general conclusions.
I. THE SIX CATEGORIES CURRENTLY EMPLOYED
The subjects of disclosure in recent cases have covered a broad range,
from the unfortunate display of an unzipped fly 9 to merciless accounts of an
unusual and embarrassing disease. '0 Some cases have involved the identifica-
In Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 91-92 (1931), the California Court of Appeals
summarized the different theories as follows: breach of contract, either express or implied;
breach of trust or confidence placed by one person in another; property rights in private letters
and writings; and libel. One of the assertions of Warren and Brandeis was that a few courts
had essentially given effect to privacy theory, even though these courts were not willing to
admit it. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 213; see Miller v. National Broadcasting Co.,
157 F. Supp. 240 (D. Del. 1957). Rather than open the door to a novel tort, these early courts
simply based their decisions on established and conveniently familiar principles, such as prop-
erty and trust.
6. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rtpr. 405, 415-16
(1962) (quoting Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225, 227
(1950)).
7. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 364-65.
8. Id. at 365.
9. Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
10. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
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tion of criminal victims,"I and others have concerned the perpetrator. 12 The
location of the publicized event might be a crowded stadium where a tele-
vised football game is taking place, 13 the plaintiff's place of business, 14 or the
plaintiff's home' 5 or hospital room. 16 The range of disclosable items is of
course vast, but the courts appear to have settled upon the following six
categories in which to assort the cases: (1) consent to the publicity, particu-
larly as inferred from the plaintiffs location; (2) the offensiveness of the pub-
licity; (3) the plaintiffs status as a public figure; (4) the newsworthiness of
the disclosed matter; (5) prior publicity given to the matter, particularly its
appearance on a public record; and (6) the extent to which the disclosure
identifies the plaintiff.
A. Location and Consent
The principle that a tort victim relinquishes the ability to recover when he
consents to the defendant's action is a familiar one.17 The plaintiffs consent
to the disclosure of a private matter, whether express or implied, will defeat
any claim that the defendant's disclosure caused an undue invasion of pri-
vacy. This result will occur even if the disclosure otherwise could be re-
garded as sensitive or embarrassing.18
An obvious example of consent is a case in which the plaintiff voluntarily
relates information to a news reporter or magazine writer.19 The presence or
absence of express consent would not seem to be significant in such a case.
With or without express consent, a court may find that the plaintiff implic-
itly consented to the resulting disclosure, similar to a tort plaintiff who
knowingly allows himself to be vaccinated without objection.20 One who
expressly consents to the disclosure cannot later claim that a tortious publi-
cation of a private fact was made. This analysis would also apply when the
plaintiff himself has previously published the disclosed facts.2 '
Most of the cases discussing consent do not involve an express agreement
to the publication, however. Absent an express agreement, a court must
determine whether the circumstances can support a finding of implied con-
11. E.g., Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 584 P.2d 1310 (1978); Ayers
v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 561 P.2d 998 (1977).
12. E.g., Travers v. Patton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966); Garner v. Triangle Publi-
cations, 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951); Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App.
1958).
13. Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977); Neff v. Time,
Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
14. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441 (1953).
15. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
16. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
17. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 18 (4th ed. 1971).
18. E.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976); Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
19. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 998 (1976).
20. O'Brien v. Cunard S.F. Co., 154 Mass. 272, 28 N.E. 266 (1891); see W. PROSSER,
supra note 17, § 18.
21. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment b.
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sent. The question often turns on the physical location of the plaintiff. In
Neff v. Time, Inc. 22 publication of a photograph of a football fan with his
pants unzipped was held not to constitute an invasion of privacy, because by
placing himself in a highly public area, the fan consented to all visual inspec-
tion. The plaintiff was one of a group of people who not only waived their
privacy by their mere presence in a football stadium, but who actually initi-
ated the idea of being photographed and actively encouraged the photogra-
pher to capture them on film. The plaintiff, therefore, waived his privacy by
actively seeking publicity. 23
According to many courts, such an affirmative effort is not necessary to
waive one's privacy. The Neff court held that privacy is waived when a
person is present at a public event and can be seen by everyone in attend-
ance. 24 For example, an affectionate embrace between husband and wife,
arguably a sensitive and private moment by most standards, properly be-
comes viewing material for millions of magazine subscribers if the embrace
is photographed in a candy store open to the public. The incident becomes
part of the public domain because it occurred in a public area and is, there-
fore, not a private matter.25
In contrast, an incident of bizarre quackery, conducted to cure a lump in
the patient's breast, was held to be protected from public disclosure. 26 In
that case the plaintiff was photographed with one of his hands on the pa-
tient's breast and the other waving a wand, while he was observing various
gadgets. The patient and the photographer, both employees of the defend-
ant, were part of a clandestine design to photograph the plaintiff for use in a
national magazine. The patient feigned the lump in her breast, and the cam-
era was hidden. Moreover, the whole event took place in the plaintiff's pri-
vate den, not in a public place. The plaintiff, therefore, did not consent,
either expressly or implicitly, to the subsequent publicity. The quack's an-
tics are more private than the lovers' embrace because of the dispositive dis-
tinction between events that take place in a public shop and those that occur
in a private den. Because five persons viewed an event in a candy store,
millions across the country could also view it.27
Protection from disclosure might also be afforded if the plaintiff was pho-
tographed in a hospital28 or mental institution. 29 Such places cannot offer
the seclusion of one's home and are necessarily public to a degree. The pres-
22. 406 F. Supp. 858, 861 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953); see Jackson v.
Playboy Enters., Inc., 574 F. Supp. 10, 13-14 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
26. Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
27. In Gill the dissent stated: "By plaintiffs doing what they did in view of a tiny fraction
of the public, does not mean that they consented to observation by the millions of readers of
the defendant's magazine." 253 P.2d at 446 (Carter, J., dissenting in part).
28. E.g., Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930); Clayman v.
Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940).
29. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. denied, 398




ence of a patient is normally involuntary, however, because it is usually com-
pelled by necessity. Voluntary exposure to the public eye is an essential
element of a public presence, and most courts have been unwilling to find
this element in a hospitalization.
This element of voluntariness would also seem to be lacking in cases in
which the plaintiff, by virtue of fortuitously standing near the location of a
notable and spontaneous event, becomes the subject of unwanted publicity.
Courts, however, have shown little sympathy for the innocent bystander.
An unoffending and unwary customer at a cigar shop, for example, found
himself the victim of unwanted publicity when the police detained him as
part of a gambling raid. Nevertheless, he was without remedy when the
local television station showed his image to the local viewers as part of its
coverage of the event.3 0 The defendant in that case did not identify the
plaintiff as a gambler, the coverage was accurate, and the broadcast con-
tained nothing unreasonably offensive. The fact that the plaintiff was in a
public place was, however, much more detrimental to his case than any of
these other facts.31
Courts have applied the same attitude to cases in which police erroneously
arrested the plaintiff or named him as a criminal suspect.3 2 The report of
such an occurrence can obviously cause devastating damage, yet courts treat
these cases much as they do cases in which the plaintiff was only a by-
stander. While one might regard any police action as an item of legitimate
public concern, 33 or as an event already in the public domain, 34 particularly
fatal to the plaintiff's case is that his arrest occurred in a public place. 35 Like
the innocent bystander, the erroneously accused in such a case can only
blame fate for his being at the wrong place at the wrong time.36
Not all cases of innocent bystanders involve the commission of a crime.
In a recent Massachusetts case the plaintiff claimed an invasion of privacy
when a newspaper photo showed him apparently standing in line for unem-
30. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television, 83 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1955).
31. Id. at 40.
32. E.g., Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Smith v.
National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600 (1956); Harrison v. Washing-
ton Post Co., 391 A.2d 781 (D.C. 1978); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting, 472 S.W.2d I (Mo.
Ct. App. 1971).
33. Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Smith v.
National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600, 602 (1956); Harrison v.
Washington Post Co., 391 A.2d 781, 784 (D.C. 1978); Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting, 472
S.W.2d 1, 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
34. Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Smith v.
National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600, 603 (1956).
35. Harrison v. Washington Post Co., 391 A.2d 781, 784 (D.C. 1978); Williams v. KCMO
Broadcasting, 472 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971).
36. Criminal victims do not fare much better. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,
420 U.S. 469 (1975); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Poteet v.
Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 584 P.2d 1310 (1978); Ayres v. Lee Enters., Inc.,
277 Or. 527, 561 P.2d 998 (1977). These cases do not rely just on location, but on other, more
substantive grounds to be discussed more fully later. See discussion of newsworthiness, infra
text accompanying notes 121-60.
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ployment benefits.3 7 He was waiting to translate for another person, rather
than to collect benefits for himself. Such a case involves a daily, unspontane-
ous occurrence and arguably not one warranting special media attention,
such as the commission of a crime. Nevertheless, the Massachusetts court
affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant and aptly summarized the
judicial attitude behind all of these cases by stating that a person loses pri-
vacy rights by appearing in a public place. 38 In a California case involving
news coverage of a suicide, the court also held for the defendant and did not
rely on the nature of the act as much as on its location.39 Courts have
applied the same theory to inanimate things, so that a person cannot object
to photographs of the exterior of his home40 or to a filming of barrels of
hazardous chemical waste placed by him in an open lot.41
The location of an event has developed as a major, if not conclusive, factor
in determining liability for public disclosure of that event. The rationale for
this result is sometimes expressed in terms of consent, 42 without recognition
that consent, to be an effective defense, must be informed consent. 43 While
one might argue that a person is always informed on the possibility of pub-
licity once he leaves his home, most people are not conscious of this possibil-
ity and have not consented to it.44
B. The Question of Offensiveness
The terms of Restatement section 652D state that liability for disclosure
occurs only if the matter is "highly offensive to a reasonable person.' '45 As in
other areas of tort law, protection is not available from the common annoy-
ances of ordinary life. 46 Public disclosure gives rise to a cause of action only
37. Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 391 N.E.2d 935 (1979).
38. 391 N.E.2d at 939.
39. In reciting the facts, the court stated: "She went to a public edifice in the heart of a
large city and there ended her life by plunging from such high building. It would be difficult to
imagine a more public method of self-destruction." Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal.
App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491, 496 (1939). The court also denied the surviving husband's claim on
the basis that the right of privacy is a personal action that dies with the person. 95 P.2d at 495.
40. Jaubert v. Crowley Post-Signal, Inc., 375 So. 2d 1386 (La. 1979).
41. Machleder v. Diaz, 538 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
42. E.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 244, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953).
43. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, at 105.
44. Judge Carter, dissenting in Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 244, 253 P.2d
441, 446 (1953), stated:
In effect, the majority holding means that anything any one does outside of his
own home is with consent to the publication thereof, because, under those cir-
cumstances he waives his right of privacy even though there is no news value in
the event. If such were the case, the blameless exposure of a portion of the
naked body of a man or woman in a public place as the result of inefficient
buttons, hooks, or other clothes-holding devices could be freely photographed
and widely published with complete immunity. . . . There is no basis for the
conclusion that the second a person leaves the portals of his home he consents to
have his photograph taken under all circumstances thereafter.
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D.
46. E.g., Gunther v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 157 F. Supp. 25 (N.D.W. Va. 1957),
appeal dismissed, 255 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1958) (not a nuisance to blast; nervous woman fright-
ened by noise); Caputzal v. Lindsay Co., 48 N.J. 69, 222 A.2d 513 (1966) (no recovery for
heart attack brought on by sight of brownish water from faucet).
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when the disclosure would affront a person of ordinary sensitivities. The
hypersensitive plaintiff will not be indulged.47
Even the most insensitive of persons, however, would want to protect cer-
tain areas of life from the prying eye, including family and personal matters,
unpleasant or humiliating illnesses, and intimate letters.48 Many of the cases
involve the exhibition of physical characteristics that one would normally
regard as private. A clear example would be publications of nude photo-
graphs. One court has stated that nudity is a private fact giving rise to
damages when shown beyond persons to whom consent is given. 49 This
statement would be particularly true when the subject of the photograph has
visibly demonstrated his lack of consent. A Massachusetts case held that a
filming of nude prison inmates, who were shown desparately trying to hide
their genital areas with their hands, was a violation of their right of pri-
vacy.50 In that case the defendant argued that the public had a "right to
know" of the conditions of such facilities, particularly those groups having a
special interest in rehabilitation.51 The Massachusetts court disposed of that
argument by holding that the indecency of the film outweighed any right to
know.
52
Other courts have also had to deal with the task of reconciling the right to
know with an individual's protection from public disclosure. In several of
these cases the plaintiffs had undergone an emotionally painful experience
because of some tragic event involving a family member, only to have their
grief aggravated by the publication of a news account of the event. In Brem-
mer v. Journal-Tribune3 the body of the plaintiffs' young son, who had been
missing, was finally discovered in a mutilated and decomposed condition. In
Waters v. Fleetwood54 the body of the plaintiff's murdered daughter was re-
covered from a river; the body was partially decomposed and wrapped in
chains. In Kelley v. Post Publishing Co.5 5 the plaintiffs' daughter had been
killed in a car accident. In each of the three cases a rather grisly photograph
of the victim's body accompanied the news account. If anything would jus-
tify a reasonable person in feeling seriously aggrieved,5 6 such a photograph
would be the thing, especially in combination with an article describing the
event and identifying the victim. In all three cases, however, the court held
47. Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982);
Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc., 186 N.J. Super. 335, 452 A.2d 689, 691-92 (Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1982).
48. Van Buren v. Miller, 22 Wash. App. 836, 592 P.2d 671, 675 (1979).
49. Myers v. U.S. Camera Publishing Corp., 167 N.Y.S.2d 771, 774 (1957); see also York
v. Story, 324 F.2d 450 (9th Cir. 1963) (defendant, a city policeman, held liable for circulating
photographs of plaintiff in "indecent positions" taken when she was at the police station filing
a complaint).
50. Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969).
51. For a more complete discussion of newsworthiness, see infra notes 121-60 and accom-
panying text.
52. 249 N.E.2d at 617.
53. 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762 (1956).
54. 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344 (1956).
55. 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951).
56. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment c.
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for the defendant, emphasizing the newsworthiness of the matter. This Arti-
cle will more fully discuss the concept of newsworthiness later,57 but it is
mentioned here to show that indecency alone does not necessarily make dis-
closure actionable. 58
Courts are more willing to protect against disclosure in cases involving a
photograph or news account of a physical ailment, than in cases involving a
mutilated corpse. Deformed parts of a person's body, even if normally visi-
ble to the public, will usually be held to be a private matter, not susceptible
to public disclosure. Liability has resulted from the publication of photo-
graphs of a semiconscious patient suffering facial disfigurement as a result of
coronary thrombosis; 59 of a malformed child, born with the heart on the
outside of the body;60 and of twins who were joined together from the shoul-
ders down. 61 Publication of the fact that a person eats incessantly because of
a rare and embarrassing disease is also unreasonably offensive.62 The physi-
cal or medical information need not concern an involuntary or life-threaten-
ing condition to warrant protection from disclosure. A recent California
case, for example, indicates that a sex change operation might be a private
matter if a jury could find its publication to violate "contemporary commu-
nity mores and standards of decency. ' '63
Courts have used a variety of terms to describe the applicable standard of
offensiveness. Some courts say that the disclosure must not "outrage com-
mon . . . decency,"' 64 or "outrage the community's notions of decency."'65
Other courts require a disclosure that causes "shame or humiliation. 66 The
defendant might be liable if he exceeds the "bounds of propriety and rea-
son" 67 or if the disclosure contains "intimate details of a 'highly personal
nature.' "68 An oft-cited case on this point is Virgil v. Time, Inc.69 The
plaintiff in that case was a body surfer of some achievement who was inter-
viewed by a reporter from a national sports magazine. During the interview,
the plaintiff revealed several bizarre incidents that portrayed him as extraor-
dinarily reckless and mentally unstable. 70 Accounts of these incidents later
57. See infra text accompanying notes 121-60.
58. Another obstacle faced by the plaintiffs in these three cases is that they were not the
subjects of public disclosure. The question of whether a person can recover for publicity given
to another is discussed later. See infra notes 208-18 and accompanying text.
59. Clayman v. Bernstein, 38 Pa. D. & C. 543 (1940).
60. Bazemore v. Savannah Hospital, 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194 (1930) (appropriation
case).
61. Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849 (1912).
62. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
63. Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 772 (1983).
64. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782
(Sup. Ct. 1947) (relying heavily upon appropriation concepts).
65. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 258,
296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 782 (1968).
66. Mason v. Williams Discount Center, Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
67. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 37, 459 P.2d 912, 923, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 371
(1969).
68. Penokie v. Michigan Technological Univ., 93 Mich. App. 650, 287 N.W.2d 304, 308
(1979).
69. 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
70. The incidents included using his mouth as an ashtray, burning two holes in his wrist,
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became part of an article appearing in the magazine. The court, quoting
approvingly from the Restatement, referred to a "community mores" test
and stated that the disclosed information is not a public matter when the
publicity "ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is enti-
tled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its
own sake."'7 1
The courts will inevitably apply an ethereal test to the most elusive ele-
ment of a still-developing tort. This "mores" test, propounded by William
Prosser in 1960,72 may truly explain some cases in which courts have de-
clined to find sufficient offensiveness to warrant liability. The publication of
a person's normal facial appearance offends no community's mores,73 and
the disclosure of a person's business or occupation 74 or the stating of a per-
son's name does not outrage common decency.75 At the other extreme, pub-
licizing the details of a physical ailment or deformity would normally offend
most people. 76 The application of a mores test at either extreme should
produce little quibbling.
Use of the mores test, however, has been more troublesome in cases that
fall between these extremes. In Bisbee v. John C. Conover Agency, Inc. ,77 for
example, the court failed to explain why a newspaper article describing the
plaintiffs' house in certain detail was not unreasonably offensive. The court
affirmed a summary judgment for the defendant, stating only that the plain-
tiff failed to establish that public knowledge of the facts was offensive.78 The
court offered no guidelines on the degree or type of offensiveness necessary
to state a cause of action. Similarly, in a case in which the defendant de-
scribed a widow's feelings during the last days of her famous husband's life,
during which he was mentally ill, the court summarily concluded that the
report "may not be treated as an impermissible revelation or as otherwise
offensive to any notion of decency." 79 Neither of these cases is instructive on
why the plaintiff's allegations were insufficient.
The court in Mason v. Williams Discount Center8° offered at least one type
diving headfirst down a flight of stairs, injuring himself to gain unemployment benefits, and
eating spiders and other insects.
71. 527 F.2d at 1129 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment f
(Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) (current version at RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment
h)).
72. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
73. Nelson v. Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. 1977).
74. Hollander v. Lubow, 277 Md. 47, 351 A.2d 421 (1976).
75. Geisberger v. Willuhn, 72 II1. App. 3d 435, 390 N.E.2d 945 (1979).
76. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
77. 186 N.J. Super. 335, 452 A.2d 689 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1982).
78. 452 A.2d at 692.
79. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 244 N.E.2d 250, 258,
296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 782 (1968). As in Bisbee, the court affirmed a summary judgment for the
defendant. The court in Random House had two additional reasons for denying the claim.
First, the plaintiff was a public figure, and second, the report was sympathetic to the plaintiff
and not offensive to any notion of decency. 244 N.E.2d at 257-58, 296 N.Y.S.2d at 781-82.
For a discussion of liability for disclosures sympathetic to the plaintiff, see infra text accompa-
nying notes 227-33.
80. 639 S.W.2d 836 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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of guideline. In a case in which defendant posted on his storefront window a
list of names of people who had written bad checks, the court viewed allega-
tions of resulting shame and humiliation as sufficient to state a cause of ac-
tion.8 1  This standard, of course, could never be dispositive. If the
defendant's disclosure associates the plaintiff with a drug overdose,8 2 an
arrest for hot-rod racing, 3 or a gambling raid,8 4 the plaintiff certainly will
feel shame and humiliation, but he still will be left without a remedy.8 5
In one of these cases, the court stated that the essence of the disclosure
tort was the unwarranted publication of intimate details of a person's private
life and rejected the plaintiff's claim, concluding that an arrest for hot-rod
racing was not an intimate detail of one's private life.8 6 Courts have ex-
pressed their concern about prying into intimate details in other ways. For
example, other courts have referred to "maudlin curiosity" 87 or to the "mor-
bid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake."88 The plain-
tiff suffers no exposure of intimate details when she is photographed, clad
only in a dish towel, while escaping from her estranged husband.8 9 Embar-
rassing and awkward as the situation might be, the only intimate details
revealed would also be revealed by an ordinary bikini. 90 Likewise, the utter-
ance of a racial slur might "outrage common decency" or "shock the con-
science," and it also might cause "shame and humiliation" to the victim, but
it does not constitute an invasion of privacy. The fact that a person is of a
racial or ethnic minority is a public matter, visible to anyone who cares to
observe, and not an intimate detail. 9'
Little constructive dialogue has occurred on what constitutes an offensive
disclosure. Neither agreement nor disagreement has arisen on this issue.
Courts have acted quite independently and have offered a collage of ideas,
causing uneven results and providing little instruction to the bar and public.
C. Public Figures, Voluntary and Involuntary
In 1964 the Supreme Court of the United States began a constitutional
revolution in the law of defamation that has had some impact on cases in-
81. Id. at 838; see Brown v. Mullarkey, 632 S.W.2d 507, 509 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
82. Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979 (1979).
83. Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840 (1952).
84. Schnable v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860 (1954).
85. One basis for all three results was the newsworthiness of the matter disclosed. Cover-
stone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, 880, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840 (1952); Beresky
v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979, 984 (1979); Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa.
609, 107 A.2d 860, 863 (1954).
86. Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, 880, cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840
(1952).
87. Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441, 446 (1953) (Carter, J.,
dissenting in part).
88. Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 1975) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment f (Tent. Draft No. 21, 1975) (current version at RE-
STATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment h)), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976).
89. Cape Publications, Inc. v. Bridges, 423 So. 2d 426 (Fla. App. 1982).
90. Id. at 427.
91. Ledsinger v. Burmeister, 114 Mich. App. 12, 318 N.W.2d 558, 563-64 (1982).
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volving the public disclosure tort. Beginning with New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan92 the Court attempted in a series of cases to reconcile the competing
interests represented by the constitutional right of free speech and the com-
mon law right to be free from defamation. 93 The result was a doctrine that
required public officials and public figures, seeking to recover for defama-
tion, to prove that the defendant published the defamatory statement with
malice, either with knowledge that the statement was false or with reckless
disregard for its truth or falsity.94
Courts have also applied the public figure concept in public disclosure
cases, although not in a way intended by the New York Times v. Sullivan line
of cases. The stricter requirement of proving malice, rather than merely neg-
ligence or no-fault, relied upon the concept that discussion of public issues
should be robust, wide-open, and uninhibited. 95 A more relaxed standard
allowing plaintiffs to recover for mere negligence or no-fault would be inhibi-
tive and could create excessive self-censorship. 96 A decade after New York
Times v. Sullivan the Supreme Court described public figures as ones who
have thrust themselves into the forefront, and the court asserted that in-
stances involving truly involuntary public figures are extremely rare. 97
Before and after this pronouncement, however, other courts rejected claims
of public disclosure on the grounds that the plaintiff was a public figure, even
though the particular facts did not involve the interest of first amendment
values and even though falsity and knowledge of falsity were not issues. 98
Courts in public disclosure cases have instead used the idea to support the
conclusion that the disclosed item was not a private matter.99
Most people would consider it appropriate to label a professional or col-
lege athlete as a public figure, and cases have held accordingly. 1° The same
92. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
93. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
403 U.S. 29 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
94. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974); Rosenbloom v. Me-
tromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153-55
(1967).
95. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
96. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-48 (1974).
97. Id. at 345.
98. E.g., Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (1950).
99. A few courts have recognized the tension between the first amendment and the public
disclosure tort. E.g., Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal. 3d 792, 809, 608 P.2d 716, 725, 163 Cal.
Rptr. 628, 637-38 (1980) ("In determining whether a cause of action has been stated, we must
consider certain principles relating to the First Amendment, for the right to keep information
private often clashes with the First Amendment right to disseminate information to the pub-
lic."); Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 1979) (first
amendment rights prevail in invasion of privacy action for accurate disclosure of information
in public records). These courts attempt to resolve this tension not by use of the Sullivan
doctrine, but by the concept of newsworthiness. Forsher, 26 Cal. 3d at 810, 608 P.2d at 726,
163 Cal. Rptr. at 638; Howard, 283 N.W.2d at 303 ("In addition to being unwise, it would
infringe the first amendment for courts to allow recovery to persons offended by a publication
of matters of legitimate public concern."). For a discussion of newsworthiness, see infra notes
121-60 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the relationship between the first amend-
ment and the public disclosure tort, see articles cited infra note 250.
100. Holt v. Cox Enters., No. C82-2847A, slip op. (N.D. Ga. Mar. 28, 1984); Cohen v.
1985] 1161
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
would also be true for a movie star or entertainer.10 1 Although it might go
too far to say that such a person has "dedicated his life to the public," as one
court asserts,102 an athlete or entertainer probably expects a certain amount
of exposure of the facts of his life. While the status of such persons seems
clear, courts in other cases have been less precise in using the public figure
concept and seem to have merged this concept with the notion of
newsworthiness.
In Meetze v. Associated Press,10 3 for example, the plaintiffs, a twenty- and
twelve-year-old couple, gave birth to a son after being married for a year.
The defendant newspaper publicized the event. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina held that the youthful parents had by their own acts assumed
the status of "public character" and had thereby lost to some extent the right
of privacy that otherwise would be theirs. 104 Perhaps the court was correct
in saying that the event was an "occurrence of public or general interest,"
which in itself might be a proper basis for rejecting the plaintiffs' claim.10 5
In regarding the plaintiffs as public characters, however, the South Carolina
court showed little thought in using that term and managed only to obscure
the primary basis for its decision. 10 6 A certain irony results since the plain-
tiffs were not truly public at all until the defendant's publication made them
SO.
The life of a public official is, without question, properly the subject of
public disclosure. A police judge' 0 7 or a housing inspector'018 will be hard-
pressed to recover for such a disclosure, particularly when the disclosure
describes misconduct in an area pertinent to his position. 10 9 Courts gener-
ally regard police officers as public figures, at least to the extent that the
disclosure involves their conduct while on duty. 110 The same would be true
for a prosecutor I ' and for one who is running for a city council position.112
One court held similarly in a case involving a World War II marine sergeant
Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320, 321 (1950); Bilney v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
43 Md. App. 560, 406 A.2d 652, 660 (1979).
101. Chaplin v. National Broadcasting Co., 15 F.R.D. 134, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Para-
mount Pictures v. Leader Press, 24 F. Supp. 1004, 1007-08 (W.D. Okla. 1938); Gaurilov v.
Duell, Sloane & Pierce, Inc., 84 N.Y.S.2d 320, 321 (1948).
102. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931).
103. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
104. 95 S.E.2d at 609.
105. For discussion of newsworthiness, see infra notes 121-60 and accompanying text.
106. See also Bereskey v. Teschner, 64 I11. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979, 984 (1978) (par-
ents of teenager who had died from an apparent drug overdose were said to have been cast into
the "public eye" and therefore were not entitled to relief for ensuing publicity).
107. Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966).
108. Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972).
109. In Harnish the plaintiff, who was a member of the local housing board, was not al-
lowed to recover for disclosure of housing code violations in rental property that he owned.
Id.
110. E.g., Cassidy v. American Broadcasting Co., 60 111. App. 3d 831, 377 N.E.2d 126, 132
(1978); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988, 992 (1975); Hull
v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644, 650-51 (1956).
111. Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 1951).




by finding that military personnel are public figures, at least partially." 3
Most of the public disclosure cases involving criminal activity have come
out in favor of the publisher, but many of these cases have involved disclo-
sure of some part of the conviction or post-sentencing procedure, such as a
parole hearing 1 4 or the trial itself.115 Other cases have involved a publica-
tion of the details of the criminal event." 6 In view of the first amendment
consideration of informing the public about criminal procedures, the fact
that courts sometimes label the plaintiffs as public figures and reject their
claim of tortious public disclosure is not surprising." 7 Courts would be
more accurate, however, to focus on the public nature of the event, rather
than to stretch the public figure concept beyond sensible application. The
result would be the same, but the basis for the result would be sounder."18
The distinction between public and private figures often does, and in many
cases should, decide the question of liability, but not in the way that some
courts have used the distinction. The tort of public disclosure of private fact
does not require a showing of a false statement; a true statement can be the
basis for liability if the true statement constitutes a wrongful invasion.11 9
Scienter of falsehood, therefore, is necessarily an irrelevant item. Neverthe-
less, some courts in public disclosure cases have discussed the subject of sci-
113. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670, 672 (1951).
Some courts in public disclosure cases have recognized and applied the idea of the "partial
public figure." Stryker submits that a person running for public office necessarily surrenders
more of his privacy than does a military figure; in the latter case, personal activities unrelated
to the plaintiffs military career are not necessarily open to public gaze. 238 P.2d at 672. In a
case involving a candidate for city council, on the other hand, another court stated that polit-
ical candidates are subject to the "most thorough scrutiny," even if the result is exposure of the
delinquent conduct of the candidate's children. Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36-37, 459
P.2d 912, 922-23, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370-71 (1969). In the Kapellas court's view, in a self-
governing society publishers should be given wide latitude in exploring the personal aspects of
those who aspire to leadership positions. Id. In Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App.
3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762 (1983), a university student body president brought an invasion of
privacy action against a newspaper for disclosing that she was a transsexual. Although the
court regarded the plaintiff as a public figure, it refused to rule as a matter of law that her
sexual identity was a public fact. Id. at 134-35, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 772-73. The court stated:
"[T]he fact that she was the first woman student body president, in itself, [does not] warrant
that her entire private life be open to public inspection." Id. at 135, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 773. See
also Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1131 (9th Cir. 1975) (public does not necessarily have
an interest in private facts about public figures), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 998 (1976); Garner v.
Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (status as a public figure
does not destroy one's right to privacy); Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d
Cir. 1940) (certain facts may be so intimate that their revelation may outrage notion of public
decency), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
114. Travers v. Patton, 261 F. Supp. 110 (D. Conn. 1966).
115. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. App. 1958).
116. E.g., Garner v. Triangle Publications, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 546 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
117. Id. at 549.
118. E.g., in Frith v. Associated Press, 176 F. Supp. 671 (E.D.S.C. 1959), the photographs
and identifications of two muggers were published after law enforcement officers released the
identification and photographs at a press conference. The court granted summary judgment
for the defendant news agency without mentioning the public figure concept. Instead, the
court held for the defendant because the information was contained on public records and was
a matter of public interest. Id. at 674. See infra notes 121-88 and accompanying text for a
discussion of public interest and public records concepts.
119. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D.
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enter as if it were important to the disposition of the case.1 20
Courts have applied the public figure concept quite loosely, often encom-
passing plaintiffs whose lives clearly were not public until the defendants'
disclosures made them so. The concept has proved to be a convenient one
for courts disposed to hold for defendants, but the cost has been the further
undermining of the public disclosure tort and decisions based upon faulty
premises.
D. The Wide-Reaching Concept of Newsworthiness
The text of section 652D states that a disclosure, to be actionable, must be
of a matter that is "not of legitimate concern to the public."' 12 In the 1940
case of Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co.' 22 a lower federal court, applying state
law, recognized that an individual's interest in privacy inevitably conflicts
with the public's interest in news and concluded that at some point the pub-
lic's interest outweighs the individual's desire for privacy. 123 Older public
disclosure cases were of a similar attitude. 124 Few, if any, of these cases
discussed this subject in constitutional terms. This newsworthiness defense
seemingly derived from the nature of the public disclosure tort itself, rather
than from the first amendment.
In Time, Inc. v. Hill,125 a 1967 privacy case involving false light, 126 the
Supreme Court fused first amendment considerations and the newsworthi-
ness concept. This fusion has caused little noticeable change, however, in
the way that courts have acted in this area. Even before the first amendment
was held to compel an allowance for newsworthiness, the courts were zeal-
ous guardians of the public's interest in news. The constitutional mandate
has possibly caused the courts to become even more disposed to reject the
victim's claim in favor of a newsworthy disclosure. A notable feature of
120. Meeropol v. Nizer, 560 F.2d 1061, 1066 (2d Cir. 1977); Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing
Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 1040, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 668 (1984) ("[D]ue to the supreme mandate of
the constitutional protection of freedom of the press even a tortious invasion of one's privacy is
exempt from liability if the publication of private facts is truthful and newsworthy."); Rawlins
v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d 988, 992-93 (1975); Estate of Heming-
way v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 224 N.E.2d 250, 258, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 781
(1968).
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D.
122. 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
123. Id. at 809.
124. See, e.g., Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491, 495
(1939); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230
Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (1929).
125. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
126. False light is defined by RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652E:
One who gives publicity to a matter concerning another that places the other
before the public in a false light is subject to liability to the other for invasion of
his privacy, if
(a) the false light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, and
(b) the actor had knowledge of or acted in reckless disregard as to the falsity
of the publicized matter and the false light in which the other would be placed.
1164 [Vol. 38
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CLAIMS
these cases is the range of items regarded by the courts to be newsworthy,
especially in cases involving the occurrence of a crime.
The public has a legitimate concern in the reporting of crime, which serves
a public necessity and goes beyond "a morbid and sensational prying into
private lives for its own sake."' 27 At a base level, news of criminal activity
could be important for individual self-preservation. At a more elevated
level, such information is necessary in assessing the society in which one
lives so as to be able to effect change, either by vote or by moral suasion.
This comports with even the seemingly restrictive view of some that news-
worthiness, and the absolute guarantee of first amendment freedom of
speech, apply only to things that are important in making an intelligent vot-
ing decision.1 28 Additionally, one would clearly regard the concern in re-
porting crime as a "legitimate public concern" as section 652D and the
courts use that term. The courts have acted accordingly, holding that one
who has been convicted of a crime is in no position to claim an invasion of
privacy when that fact is publicized. 129
Courts have extended the newsworthiness defense beyond cases in which a
convicted criminal is the subject of disclosure. The only public disclosure
case from the United States Supreme Court concerned the victim of a
crime. 130 In that case the Court held unconstitutional a state statute making
it a misdemeanor to broadcast a rape victim's name. 31 The Court did not
find a need to determine the existence of a public interest in such informa-
tion; instead, it deferred to a presumed finding by the state legislature. 32
State courts have acted similarly, holding that the newsworthiness of a crim-
inal event applies to the identification of the victim.'3 3 These cases do not
offer much in the way of explanation, but instead seem only to assume that
any person who participates, whether voluntarily or involuntarily, in a news-
worthy event loses his right of privacy, at least to the extent of being able to
conceal his identity.
127. Id. § 652D comment h. But see Sipple v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d
1040, 201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (1984).
128. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 94
(1948).
129. Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1332-33 (D.D.C. 1978); Bernstein
v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 835 (D.D.C. 1955); Kilgore v. Younger, 30
Cal. 3d 770, 640 P.2d 793, 800, 180 Cal. Rptr. 657, 664 (1982).
130. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
131. Id. at 496-97.
132. The court stated that "[b]y placing the information in the public domain on official
court records, the State must be presumed to have concluded that the public interest was
thereby being served." Id. at 495. For a discussion of public records, see infra notes 161-88
and accompanying text.
133. Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F.2d 409, 410-11 (5th Cir. 1962); Jenkins v. Dell
Publishing Co., 143 F. Supp. 952, 955 (W.D. Pa. 1956), a~ffd, 251 F.2d 447 (3d Cir.) cert.
denied, 357 U.S. 921 (1958); Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So. 2d 235, 237 (1955);
Waters v. Fleetwood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344, 348 (1956); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune
Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762, 768 (1956); Hyde v. City of Columbia, 637 S.W.2d 251,
264 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record, Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 584 P.2d 1310,
1312 (1978); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147, 148 (1962). For
further discussion of the identification issue, see infra notes 195-226 and accompanying text.
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Courts have applied the newsworthiness defense in cases brought by par-
ticipants in the criminal process other than the victim or the convicted. The
defense would obviously apply to the prosecutor of a criminal action; not
only is he a public official, but he is also an active and willing participant in a
matter of considerable public interest. 134 Courts have also extended this de-
fense to include a lawyer who assisted the police in solving a murder. 1 35 One
court has also concluded that a woman's attempted defense of her husband
against a fatal stabbing constituted "an occurrence of public or general inter-
est," which justified her identification in a newspaper article describing the
event. 1
36
The newsworthiness defense also applies against persons who were not
directly involved in the occurrence or prosecution of the crime and who
were mistakenly identified as participants. These persons, like victims and
unlike enforcers and perpetrators, are not voluntary participants in the crim-
inal event itself. Unlike victims, their involvement would be insignificant
and transitory, but for the public disclosure. In a Florida case in which the
police conducted a gambling raid on a cigar shop, an innocent bystander,
present only to buy a newspaper, was mistakenly detained, but not arrested.
A news broadcast showed him being detained. Despite his innocence and
involuntariness, the Florida Supreme Court held against the plaintiff since
he was an actor, although unwittingly, in an occurrence of public interest. 137
In another case the plaintiff had been identified mistakenly as one who com-
mitted two serious crimes, although he was later cleared of suspicion. The
defendant's article reported both the false accusation and the exoneration,
and the entire episode was held to be "of news interest."' 1 38 In a Missouri
case the defendant was held not liable for its televised news account of an
erroneous arrest in which the defendant specifically identified the arrestee. 13 9
The court held that the defendant was not liable for the disclosure because
actions by the police are of "proper public concern."' 140
In each of these cases the circumstance that linked the plaintiff's name
with the occurrence was fortuitous. The association was not due to a con-
scious and voluntary choice by the plaintiff, and the plaintiff was not a law
enforcer. Had it not been for the defendant's action in publicizing the event,
the plaintiff's association with the occurrence would happily have faded into
unrecorded oblivion. The plaintiff instead underwent embarrassing and un-
deserved publicity. He was also forced to risk the unfair judgment of observ-
ers who feel that just as smoke indicates fire, so also does implication prove
guilt.
The courts have been quite willing to extend the scope of newsworthiness
134. Estill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 186 F.2d 1017, 1022 (7th Cir. 1951).
135. Humiston v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 189 A.D. 467, 178 N.Y.S. 752 (1919).
136. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 229, 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (1929).
137. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television, 83 So. 2d 34, 37 (Fla. 1955).
138. Johnson v. Evening Star, 344 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
139. Williams v. KCMO Broadcasting, 472 S.W.2d 1, 4-6 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); see Harri-
son v. Washington Post Co., 391 A.2d 781, 784 (D.C. 1978).
140. 472 S.W.2d at 4.
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far beyond the occurrence of crime. An article describing a physician's mal-
practice is of legitimate public concern,' 41 as is the testimony from a divorce
proceeding. 142 The range of newsworthy items also includes the occurrence
of a suicide, 143 a death caused by a drug overdose, 144 the suffocation of the
plaintiff's children in an abandoned refrigerator, 145 and the removal of dead
bodies from a burnt cottage.146 Newsworthiness also includes more positive
subjects, such as a North Pole expedition1 47 and the life of a famous conduc-
tor.148 The fact that the plaintiff persuaded a woman not to jump off the
Golden Gate Bridge is also newsworthy.1 49
Only rarely have the courts held against the public's interest in the report-
ing of news.' 50 On some of these rare occasions, the courts seem not to have
denied the potential public interest in the event disclosed, but instead to have
found that other considerations, such as the shame and humiliation suffered
by the plaintiff, outweighed the public's interest.151 More often, courts have
had little trouble in finding newsworthiness even in very sensitive items. A
striking example of this comes from the 1979 Iowa case of Howard v. Des
Moines Register & Tribune Co.' 52 The defendant in that case published a
newspaper article describing improper treatment of patients by a public care
facility. As one of its examples the article stated that the plaintiff, while a
minor, had been sterilized as a precondition to being released from the insti-
tution. The court held the entire account, including the identification of the
plaintiff by name and hometown, to be newsworthy and absolved the news-
paper and its reporter of liability.' 53
The Howard court not only failed to offer a precise test of newsworthiness,
but seemed to decide the case in a cursory manner, with no test whatsoever
in mind. The court did quote the comment to the Restatement stating that
one limitation to newsworthiness is "common decency, having due regard to
141. Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308-09 (10th Cir. 1981).
142. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957, 961-62 (D. Minn. 1948).
143. Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95 P.2d 491, 495-96 (1939).
144. Beresky v. Teschner, 64 11. App. 3d 848, 381 N.E.2d 979, 983-85 (1978).
145. Costlow v. Cusimano, 34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94 (1970).
146. Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 300 N.W.2d 687, 689-90 (1980).
147. Smith v. Suratt, 7 Alaska 416, 423 (1926).
148. Koussevitzky v. Allen, Towne & Heath, Inc., 188 Misc. 479, 68 N.Y.S.2d 779, 782-83
(Sup. Ct.), affid, 272 A.D. 759, 69 N.Y.S.2d 432, appeal denied, 272 A.D. 794, 71 N.Y.S.2d
712 (1947).
149. Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
150. E.g., McCabe v. Village Voice, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Logan v.
District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (D.D.C. 1978); Diaz v. Oakland Tribune,
Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 126, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 767 (1983); Conklin v. Sloss, 86 Cal. App.
3d 241, 244-46, 150 Cal. Rptr. 121, 123-24 (1978); Briscoe v. Readers Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal.
3d 529, 541-43, 483 P.2d 34, 42-44, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 874-76 (1971); Rafferty v. Hartford
Courant Co., 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 416 A.2d 1215, 1218-20 (1980); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348
Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 294-95 (1942); Mason v. Williams Discount Center, Inc., 639
S.W.2d 836, 838-39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
151. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 294-95 (1942); Mason v. Wil-
liams Discount Center, Inc., 639 S.W.2d 836, 838 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Brown v. Mullarkey,
632 S.W.2d 507, 509-10 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
152. 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
153. 283 N.W.2d at 303-04.
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the freedom of the press and its reasonable leeway to choose what it will tell
the public, but also due regard to the feelings of the individual and the harm
that will be done to him by the exposure."' 15 4 Perhaps this is the best that
any court can offer as a general statement on the matter. Ultimately, how-
ever, the due regard for the freedom of the press became total capitulation to
the discretion of the editor. After describing the defendant's article as inves-
tigative journalism, the court rather meekly concluded that this journalistic
technique was permissible.155
Perhaps Professor Kalven was right in arguing that the newsworthiness
concept was so overpowering that it could virtually swallow the public dis-
closure tort.156 As a practical matter, courts may simply consider whatever
the press prints to be newsworthy just because the press prints it.'1 7 Most
courts have in fact acted in a pliant and deferential manner. One writer has
asserted that courts are justified in doing so because the news media are
economically motivated to publish only matters of interest to the public;
therefore, editorial judgments concerning what the public wants to know are
apt to be sound and legitimate.158
For whatever rationale, the courts are willing to allow publishers not only
to meet public need, but to cater to public curiosity, without any attempt in
the process to articulate a test to distinguish the two. Even the idlest of
gossip is sometimes accorded the protection of newsworthiness. 159 Courts
must recognize that "[j]ust as war is too important to be left to generals so is
the right to publish too important to be left solely to professional media
sellers." ° Up to this point, however, many courts have allowed the gener-
als to have a free rein.
E. Facts that are Already Public
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 16 1 the Supreme Court's only public
disclosure case, the Court held that the father of a deceased rape victim had
no cause of action when a television broadcast revealed his daughter's
name.162 The defendant's reporter had obtained the victim's name from
indictment records made available at the court appearances of the six per-
154. Id. at 302 (quoting RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment h).
155. 283 N.W.2d at 302.
156. Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROBs. 326, 336 (1966).
157. Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 Sup. CT. REV. 267, 283-84; see Bezanson, Public Disclosure as News: Injunctive Relief
and Newsworthiness in Privacy Actions Involving the Press, 64 IOWA L. REV. 1061, 1098-99
(1979).
158. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 353-54; Comment, First Amendment Limitations on
Public Disclosure Actions, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 180, 192-93 (1977).
159. In Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414
(1962), for example, the court held for the defendant, a Hollywood gossip magazine that wrote
about the teenage relationship between the plaintiff and a movie star.
160. Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co., 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 416 A.2d 1215, 1217 (1980).
161. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
162. Id. at 495-96.
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sons charged with the crime. Relying upon a Georgia statute 163 making the
publishing or broadcasting of the name of a rape victim a misdemeanor, the
victim's father brought suit and recovered a judgment based upon the stat-
ute. On appeal the Georgia Supreme Court held that the statute did not
provide for a civil cause of action, but did hold that the plaintiff had a cause
of action based upon the common law tort of public disclosure. 164
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 165 In holding that the first
and fourteenth amendments barred the plaintiffs recovery, the Court de-
ferred to the state's decision to place the information on official court
records. 166 In doing so, said the Court, "the State must be presumed to have
concluded that the public interest was thereby being served. 1 67 The Court
placed heavy emphasis upon the public's reliance on the media to report
"the proceedings of government" and asserted that "official records and doc-
uments open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations."'168
The Court failed to show, however, how revelation of the victim's name
helped people to vote intelligently or to register opinions on government ad-
ministration,169 or why such information would necessarily be of interest to
people concerned with government administration. 70 The Court ultimately
deferred at two levels: to the state in its decision to make the information a
matter of public record, and to the defendant in its decision to publicize it.
On this latter point, the Court concluded that reliance must rest upon the
judgment of the media. 171
The Court based its decision on constitutional considerations, 172 but it
need not have done so. The nature of the public disclosure tort itself would,
in the view of many courts, have precluded recovery here simply because the
information was obtained from public records. Comment b to Restatement
section 652D states that no liability should result from information that is
"already publicly known" and includes as an example facts that are "matters
of public record."' 173 The Court itself suggested that the bare existence of a
public document made the difference on the question of liability. 174 The
Court need not have assessed the information for its value in voting intelli-
gently or in keeping tabs on government conduct; the only concern is
whether the state has chosen to place the information on a public document.
Such is the attitude of almost all of the courts that have dealt with this
163. GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9901 (1983), cited in Cox Broadcasting, 420 U.S. at 471.
164. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 231 Ga. 60, 62, 200 S.E.2d 127, 130 (1973).
165. 420 U.S. at 497.
166. Id. at 492.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 491.
170. Id. at 495.
171. Id. at 496.
172. Id. at 497.
173. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment b.
174. 420 U.S. at 496. The Court said that "[i]f there are privacy interests to be protected in
judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or
other exposure of private information." Id.
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question. 175 The involuntary nature of the plaintiff's involvement does not
matter.176 The fact that a personal matter appears on a public document of
some kind is sufficient to make the personal fact available for widespread
circulation. The plaintiff's delinquency on tax payments 177 or status as a
drug patient 178 is publishable if a public document already contains the fact.
Even as sensitive a fact as an involuntary sterilization is fair game if it al-
ready appears on a public record. 179 Courts have considered divorce,' 80
criminal, 18 1 custody hearing, 182 lawsuit, 183 tax,' 84 and marriage and annul-
ment 185 records to be public records, with their contents available for public
disclosure. One court has held a birth certificate, which performs little, if
any, government-checking function, to be a proper basis for an Associated
Press article regarding the birth of a child to twenty- and twelve-year-old
parents.' 86 Only rarely have courts allowed recovery when the disclosure
was of a matter contained in a public record.187
The position that public records generally promote the government-check-
ing process has substance. In the application of this position, however, an
idea that should be based on sound public policy has become arbitrary and
dispositive, encompassing all that a public record happens to contain, re-
gardless of the content of the disclosed item. The courts apparently assume
that the items disclosed, by virtue of being on a public record, are already
known- to the public. 188 While it is true that such information is available to
175. See, e.g., Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93 (1931) (no civil liability
because state had placed information on public document); Poteet v. Roswell Daily Record,
Inc., 92 N.M. 170, 584 P.2d 1310, 1312 (1978) (same); Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69
N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147, 148 (1962) (same); Ayers v. Lee Enters., Inc., 277 Or. 527, 561 P.2d
998, 1002 (1977) (same).
176. Hubbard v. Journal Publishing Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147, 149 (1962).
177. Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84, 88 (Ky. 1966).
178. Logan v. District of Columbia, 447 F. Supp. 1328, 1332 (D.D.C. 1978).
179. Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co., 283 N.W.2d 289, 298 (Iowa 1979).
180. Winegard v. Larsen, 260 N.W.2d 816, 818 (Iowa 1978).
181. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Lopez, 216 Kan. 108, 531 P.2d 455, 469 (1975).
182. Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 79 F. Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948).
183. Hurley v. Northwest Publications, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 970 (D. Minn. 1967), affid,
398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Goodrich v. Waterbury Republican-American, Inc., 188 Conn.
107, 448 A.2d 1317, 1322 (1982); Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 287 S.W.2d 32,
37 (1956).
184. Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84, 87-88 (Ky. 1966);
Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369, 370 (1944).
185. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 415
(1962).
186. Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1956). The court also
gave other grounds for its decision of nonliability, including the newsworthiness of the publica-
tion. Id. Contra Diaz v. Oakland Tribune, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 118, 188 Cal. Rptr. 762, 771
(1983) (plaintiff's Puerto Rican birth certificate was not a public record for purposes of a pub-
lic disclosure case).
187. Conklin v. Sloss, 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, 150 Cal. Rptr. 121, 126 (1978) (sufficient time
lapsed to render matter private); Patterson v. Tribune Co., 146 So. 2d 623, 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1962) (relied on Florida privacy statute).
188. See Moore, A Newspaper's Risks in Reporting "Facts" from Presumably Reliable
Sources.: A Study in the Practical Application of the Right to Privacy, 22 S.C.L. REV. 1, 13
(1970) (implying that if all relevant information is a matter of public record, fact that it is not
known to readers is inconsequential).
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the public, in most cases few people have actually reviewed the public record
or discovered the particular information. The information, therefore, is a
matter of public record, but is usually not a matter of public knowledge.
The information in some cases is arguably a matter of public knowledge,
although not contained in a public record. The process in these cases is not
as mechanical as in the public records cases. Determining whether some
fact is a matter of public knowledge is not as clear-cut as determining
whether a certain item appears on a public record. As in the public records
cases, however, this determination is usually made in favor of defendants. In
Forsher v. Bugliosi,189 for example, the association, in the defendant's book,
of the plaintiff with the disappearance and murder of a person was held not
to be the basis for a cause of action, partly because the plaintiff had previ-
ously been mentioned in two earlier newspaper articles regarding the occur-
rence.' 90 The embarrassment of being mistakenly identified as a criminal
suspect is magnified when subsequent newspaper articles describe the mis-
take and the exoneration, but no liability results if the occurrence was al-
ready in the public domain.' 9' In a similar case involving a conviction and a
Presidential pardon, the court emphasized that the criminal case had re-
ceived considerable publicity, that newspaper files contained accounts of the
entire episode, and that a radio play based on these events had been broad-
cast. 192 A radio program based on a false report of the escape of a black
panther was held not to be the basis for liability, despite plaintiff's arguments
that the program revived psychological problems and the scorn and ridicule
of friends. 193 One basis for this position was that the incident was not drawn
from the plaintiffs "private affairs or activities," but rather was a matter
"known to the public."' 194
Whether generally known to the public or known in the sense of being
contained on a public record, the courts plainly have developed a clear view
as to how these cases should be decided: if a "public document" contains
the fact, or if the fact is otherwise already publicly known, no liability results
from further dissemination of that fact. The initial exposure, however lim-
ited, justifies the subsequent publicity, however widespread.
189. 26 Cal. 3d 792, 608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980).
190. Id. at 812, 608 P.2d at 727, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 639-40.
191. Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
192. Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817 (D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232
F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1956). The court in Bernstein stated that persons formerly public are not
protected from the disclosure of known facts through the reading of publications, oral repeti-
tion of facts, or reprinting of known facts of general interest that are made in a reasonable
manner and for a legitimate purpose. 129 F. Supp. at 828; see also Miller v. National Broad-
casting Co., 157 F. Supp. 240, 241-43 (D. Del. 1957) (citing Bernstein, 129 F. Supp. at 817)
(court rejected plaintiffs claim for reimbursement for defendant's use of plaintiff's life story,
because story was already public).
193. Smith v. National Broadcasting Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 292 P.2d 600, 603 (1956).
194. 292 P.2d at 603; see also Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d
765, 770 (1970) (information from interviews with people who knew the plaintiff was not re-
garded as private to the plaintiff).
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F. Identification of the Plaintiff
A given public disclosure would seem not to be actionable unless it in
some way can be related to a particular person. A plaintiff should not be
able to recover unless the disclosure reasonably identifies him, for only then
can he justifiably argue that he has been harmed. In Meeropol v. Nizer' 95 the
defendant was held not liable for publishing a book about the trial of the
plaintiffs' natural parents in which he referred to the plaintiffs by their origi-
nal names. 196 Because the plaintiffs were currently known by the name of
their adoptive parents, no identification of the plaintiffs and no invasion of
privacy occurred. 197 Other courts have also held for the publisher on the
basis that the publication did not identify the plaintiff.' 98
Conversely, use of the plaintiff's name would seem to be the basis for lia-
bility in some cases. A few writers have argued that the identification of the
plaintiff is not essential to the public interest in most cases, that the disclosed
facts need not be associated with particular individuals, and that liability
should result when the disclosure identifies the plaintiff. 99 Some courts
have agreed, 2°° but most courts have found some way to avoid imposing
liability. A leading example is Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co.,201 in which the defendant published an article describing the abusive
practices of a county home, which included the involuntary sterilization of
the plaintiff. The plaintiff, while conceding the newsworthiness of the sub-
ject, argued that the disclosure of her identity was not justifiable. The court
disagreed, saying that the identification contributed to the effectiveness of
the report. 20 2 The court admitted that the identification was not essential,
but stated that the publishers could properly strengthen the force of their
evidence by naming the participants in the story.20 3 In addition to lending
credibility to the story, the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity served to at-
tract the reader's attention to the story. The court gave very little, if any,
consideration to the interests of the plaintiff. The court certainly did not
balance the competing interests. The only test that the defendant had to
195. 560 F.2d 1061 (2d Cir. 1977) (appropriation case; brought under N.Y. CIv. RIGHTS
LAW §§ 50, 51 (McKinney 1976)), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
196. 560 F.2d at 1067-68.
197. Id.
198. E.g., Miller v. National Broadcasting Co., 157 F. Supp. 240, 243 (D. Del. 1957); Aber-
nathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So. 2d 235, 236-37 (1955); Smith v. National Broadcasting
Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 307, 292 P.2d 600, 602-04 (1956); Jacova v. Southern Radio & Televi-
sion Co., 83 So. 2d 34, 40 (Fla. 1955) (innocent bystander); cf Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications,
Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (1962) (court admitted that plaintiff was
reasonably identified, but held for defendant because disclosure was a matter of public
interest).
199. See Swan, Publicity Invasion of Privacy: Constitutional and Doctrinal Difficulties with
a Developing Tort, 58 OR. L. REV. 483, 499-500 (1980); Comment, supra note 158, at 210.
200. See infra notes 219-26 and accompanying text.
201. 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979). See supra text accompanying notes 152-55 for news-
worthiness aspects of this case.
202. 283 N.W.2d at 303.
203. Id.; see Bezanson, supra note 157, at 1097-98 (discussing Howard).
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meet was whether the disclosure of the plaintiff's identity in some way aided
the story.
Disclosure of identity is more reasonable in a story describing a perpetra-
tor, rather than a victim. In Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co.,2°4 for exam-
ple, the defendant published an article that concerned a doctor's acts of
malpractice and identified the doctor by name. Identification arguably
serves a useful purpose in such a case, because the readers can take warning
about a particular doctor. 20 5 The fact that the perpetrator's own acts precip-
itated the event in the first place may also influence the court's decision.
When the court in Gilbert justified the identification, however, it did so on
grounds that considered only its benefit to the defendant's story. 20 6
While these decisions appear to endorse more forceful journalism, they do
not take into account the public's need for information, the exercise of first
amendment freedoms, or the defendant's interest in remaining anonymous.
A balance of these factors may weigh in favor of identification without liabil-
ity, but those courts that are particularly concerned with freedom of the
press appear unwilling to use the balancing approach. In any event, most
courts addressing the issue have refused to impose liability for identifying
the plaintiff.20 7
Courts have also been unsympathetic to the claims of family members.
The immediate victim is arguably not the only sufferer, because family mem-
bers also bear some of the consequence of the defendant's publication. Em-
barrassing behavior may naturally be attributed to family members,
particularly parents, and they arguably should be compensated for the vica-
rious suffering and embarrassment that they experience. 20 8 Nevertheless,
most courts have rejected such claims for vicarious damages. The Alabama
Supreme Court considered this question in Abernathy v. Thornton,20 9 in
which a mother sought to recover for the publication of photographs and
articles concerning her murdered son. The court referred to this as a "rela-
tional" right of privacy, but ultimately rejected the idea in that case. 2 10
204. 665 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1981).
205. See also Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 536, 483 P.2d 34, 39, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 871 (1971), in which the court reasoned the same way. It stated: "While such an
identification may not presume guilt, it may legitimately put others on notice that the named
individual is suspected of having committed a crime." Id.
206. The Gilbert court stated:
With respect to the publication of plaintiff's photograph and name, we find that
these truthful representations are substantially relevant to a newsworthy topic
because they strengthen the impact and credibility of the article. They obviate
any impression that the problems raised in the article are remote or hypotheti-
cal, thus providing an aura of immediacy and even urgency that might not exist
had plaintiff's name and photograph been suppressed.
665 F.2d at 308.
207. See, e.g., Sidis v. F-R Publications, 113 F.2d 806, 810 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d 773, 776-77 (Del. 1963); Fry v. Ionia
Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 300 N.W.2d 687, 690-91 (1980).
208. Swan, supra note 199, at 492-93.
209. 263 Ala. 496, 83 So. 2d 235 (1955).
210. The court stated that "the relational right must be subject to at least the same limita-
tions as the ordinary right of privacy." 83 So. 2d at 237.
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Since the murder of her son .was a matter of legitimate public interest, no
liability, either direct or vicarious, resulted from its publication.21' The
court noted that the plaintiff herself was not mentioned in the article. 2 12 The
court did not address the question of whether the mother could recover in a
case in which the son would have recovered.
Other cases have been more direct, holding that a relative cannot maintain
an action for public disclosure unless that relative is personally implicated by
the publicity. 213 This would presumably be true even if the primary victim
had a valid cause of action. One rationale for this restrictive view is the fear
of not being able to limit liability. 21 4 Another concern is that the harm suf-
fered is too subjective and difficult to assess, thus opening the door for spuri-
ous claims. 2 15 The upshot is that parents, siblings, and spouses generally
may not recover vicariously for public disclosures of private facts. Excep-
tions to this have been rare and have involved cases in which the plaintiffs'
badly deformed child was the subject of the disclosure. 216 These cases have
not carried much weight, however, and at least one of them was subse-
quently described as "an extreme case," 2 17 involving commercial use of pho-
tographs of the nude, deformed body of the plaintiffs' child. 218
In some cases courts have critically examined the need to identify the
plaintiff and have found it lacking, ruling in favor of the plaintiff.219 The
211. Id.; accord Wagner v. Fawcett Publications, 307 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1962) (appropria-
tion case); Rozhon v. Triangle Publications, 230 F.2d 359, 361 (7th Cir. 1956) (facts surround-
ing death of plaintiff's teenage son by drug overdose); Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d
118, 120-21 (1948) (facts concerning the lives of the family of a man found after missing for 20
years); Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, 880-81 (facts concerning arrest),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 840 (1952); Metter v. Los Angeles Examiner, 35 Cal. App. 2d 304, 95
P.2d 491, 495-96 (1939) (autopsy details); Beresky v. Teschner, 64 Ill. App. 3d 848, 381
N.E.2d 979, 984-85 (1979) (life of dead drug addict); Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing
Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762, 766-68 (1956) (picture of son's mutilated corpse); Sellers v.
Henry, 329 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Ky. 1959) (daughter's mutilated corpse); Costlow v. Cusimano,
34 A.D.2d 196, 311 N.Y.S.2d 92, 94-95 (1970) (death of children suffocated in refrigerator).
212. 83 So. 2d at 237.
213. Fry v. Ionia Sentinel-Standard, 101 Mich. App. 725, 300 N.W.2d 687, 690 (1980). In
Aquino v. Bulletin Co., 190 Pa. Super. 528, 154 A.2d 422 (1959), the court said that the action
was a personal one, and the defendant was not liable to the parents for disclosures about their
daughter. 154 A.2d at 430.
214. One court has articulated this fear as follows: "[I]f the parents had a cause of action
in a case like the present there would seem to be no reason why other members of the immedi-
ate family, the brothers and sisters, whose sensibilities may also have been wounded should not
also be permitted to sue." Kelly v. Post Publishing Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286, 287-88
(1951); accord Coverstone v. Davies, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 239 P.2d 876, 881, cert. denied, 344 U.S.
840 (1952).
215. Moore v. Charles B. Pierce Film Enters., 589 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1979, writ refd n.r.e.).
216. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194, 197 (1930); Douglas v.
Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (1912).
217. Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publishing Co., 247 Iowa 817, 76 N.W.2d 762, 768
(1956) (discussing Bazemore).
218. The fact that the children had died before the publication occurred affected the out-
come of both cases. Bazemore v. Savannah Hosp., 171 Ga. 257, 155 S.E. 194, 197 (1930);
Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 149 S.W. 849, 850 (1912).
219. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541-44, 483 P.2d 34, 43-44, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 866, 875-76 (1971); Conklin v. Sloss, 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, 245-49, 150 Cal. Rptr. 121,
124-25 (1978); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (1931).
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courts have considered the effect that identification would have on rehabili-
tation from lives of crime. One of these courts concluded that identification
served no public purpose in the administration of justice, such as soliciting
witnesses; instead, identification served only to hamper the important pro-
cess of rehabilitation by preventing the offender, after having paid the price
for his misdeed, from reverting to an anonymous and inconspicuous sta-
tion.220  Rehabilitation would be particularly undermined if many years
have passed since the commission of the crime. All of society, as well as the
offender himself, has an interest in allowing the rehabilitated person to leave
his past behind. 221 Many courts seem to say that a rehabilitated person has
earned the right to forget and society has an interest in protecting that right.
Although the events themselves are subject to exposure and publicity, the
name of the one-time offender is not.222
In a case in which the defendant published a story about the plaintiffs
disease that caused her to eat incessantly, the court emphasized the lack of
need to identify the plaintiff.223 The fact that the identification was not es-
sential to the story was a strong factor in the court's decision. The plaintiff's
name was simply not necessary to give the public medical information as to
the symptoms, nature, causes, or results of her ailment. 224 The defendant's
argument that identification of the plaintiff would attract the interest of
readers did not convince the court.225 This conclusion contrasts with the
view of most courts, which find merit in anything that strengthens the credi-
bility and impact of the article.226 Even if the disclosure does identify the
plaintiff, courts have other means available to avoid imposing liability.
Courts generally deny recovery in cases in which the disclosure was of a
220. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 542, 483 P.2d 34, 43, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866, 875 (1971).
221. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 483 P.2d 34, 40, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866, 868 (1971) (11 years); Conklin v. Sloss, 86 Cal. App. 3d 241, 243, 150 Cal. Rptr. 121, 122
(1978) (20 years); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91, 91 (1931) (13 years). But see
Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 189 A.2d 773, 773-75 (1963) (allowing publication
after 9 years); Montesano v. Donrey Media Group, 668 P.2d 1081, 1088 (Nev. 1983) (publica-
tion allowed after 20 years), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2172, 80 L. Ed. 2d 555 (1984). In cases
that do not involve rehabilitated criminals courts generally reject the argument that the pas-
sage of time renders a fact private. Sidis v. F-R Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940); Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 2d 733,
20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 414 (1962); Rawlins v. Hutchinson Publishing Co., 218 Kan. 295, 543 P.2d
988, 996 (1975); Schnabel v. Meredith, 378 Pa. 609, 107 A.2d 860, 863 (1954). The attitude of
these courts seems to be that "once a man has become a public figure, or news, he remains a
matter of legitimate recall to the public mind to the end of his days." Rawlins, 218 Kan. at
303, 543 P.2d at 994-95 (quoting Prosser, supra note 72, at 418).
222. Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 537, 483 P.2d 34, 39-40, 93 Cal. Rptr.
866, 871-72 (1971); accord Bernstein v. National Broadcasting Co., 129 F. Supp. 817, 828
(D.D.C. 1955), aff'd, 232 F.2d 369 (D.C. Cir.) (for defendant because plaintiff's name not
mentioned), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 945 (1956). Contra Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 189 A.2d
773, 776-77 (Del. 1963) (plaintiff's name allowed to be printed).
223. The court stated that the plaintiff's ailment may be a matter of public interest because
it is unusual, but the identity of the person suffering from this ailment is not. Barber v. Time,
Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295 (1942).
224. 159 S.W.2d at 295.
225. See id.
226. Gilbert v. Medical Economics Co., 665 F.2d 305, 308 (10th Cir. 1981).
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matter not adverse to the plaintiff.227 Under this rationale, no liability ac-
crues if the disclosure describes a wife's heroic attempts to save her husband
from a stabbing incident or if it describes her statements of intended re-
venge.228 A defendant is not liable when the disclosure details the plaintiff's
successful efforts to dissuade a person from committing suicide. 229 One
court noted that such an account was not derogatory or negative, but instead
was most laudatory. 230 The same would apply to accounts that are neutral
and simply contain no criticism of the plaintiff,23' and of accounts that are
sympathetic. 2 32 If the interest to be protected by the public disclosure tort is
one's privacy, rather than one's reputation, it would seem irrelevant whether
the disclosure was of a matter not adverse.
233
Another available defense is that not only has the disclosure not identified
the plaintiff, but that no public disclosure has occurred. The Restatement
requires communication to the public at large before a public disclosure has
been made.234 Disclosure of the details of a highly personal phone conversa-
tion, therefore, did not result in liability when the disclosure was to only five
persons, all of whom were management employees of the defendant corpora-
tion. 235 Publicity also does not occur when a consumer reporting firm pro-
vides information to its client, an insurance company, about plaintiff's
insurance history to assist in assessing the validity of a current claim. 2
36
Public disclosure also has not occurred when the disclosure is limited to the
plaintiff's wife, 2 3 7 to the plaintiff's employer and three relatives,238 to the
estranged husband of plaintiff's sister, 239 or to a couple of attorneys. 24° Tell-
ing a plaintiff's employer of the plaintiff's failure to pay a debt is not a public
227. See, e.g., Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 910 (1965); Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D.
Cal. 1954); Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 229, 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (1929); Estate of
Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 353, 244 N.E.2d 250, 258, 296 N.Y.S.2d
771, 782 (1968); Hull v. Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644, 650-51 (1956).
228. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 229, 18 S.W.2d 972, 973 (1929).
229. Samuel v. Curtis Publishing Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1954).
230. Id.
231. See Johnson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 344 F.2d 507, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 910 (1965).
232. Estate of Hemingway v. Random House, Inc., 23 N.Y.2d 341, 353, 244 N.E.2d 250,
258, 296 N.Y.S.2d 771, 782 (1968).
233. At least one court so noted, stating that "[i]t would seem that the right of privacy,
distinct from defamation, might include the right not to have one's picture published under
circumstances which are complimentary as well as those which are critical .... ." Hull v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 182 Pa. Super. 86, 125 A.2d 644, 650 (1956). That court also conceded,
however, that liability is generally found only when the disclosure causes "outrage" or "mental
suffering, shame or humiliation." Id. (quoting from Smith v. Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 37 So. 2d
118, 120 (1948)).
234. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment a. This requirement is to be con-
trasted with publication for purposes of defamation, "which includes any communication by
the defendant to a third person." Id.
235. Beard v. Akzona, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1981).
236. Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 419 (8th Cir. 1978).
237. Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591, 598 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
238. Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 154, 327 A.2d 133, 132-38 (1974).
239. Nagy v. Bell Tel. Co., 292 Pa. Super. 24, 436 A.2d 701, 703 (1981).
240. Brown v. Mullarkey, 632 S.W.2d 507, 510 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982).
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disclosure,24 1 but placing the same information in a storefront window lo-
cated on a well-travelled public street is.24 2 A disclosure is public if it is
made in a newspaper, a magazine, a handbill distributed to a large number
of persons, a radio broadcast, or an address to a large audience.
243
The defendant can be held liable only if he intends or permits a reasonably
broad publication, 244 although determining how broad the publication must
be is not an easy task in all cases. One court stated that the audience need
not be the general public, but rather can be a smaller segment of the general
public if the publication is embarrassing to the plaintiff.245 Courts, however,
have not widely accepted this position. Most courts have taken a more re-
strictive view, and the result is that the plaintiff, who may be most concerned
about shielding information from finite groups closest to him, must never-
theless establish that the disclosure was to a less finite "public at large."
II. SUMMARY OF THE CURRENT STATUS
The above categories can be used to assess the present state of the law.
Two of them offer relatively straightforward tests with results that are fairly
predictable. The plaintiff's presence in a public setting246 or the appearance
of the disclosed fact on a public record247 will usually result in a denial of
recovery. All have developed as pro-defendant standards with the result
that courts have allowed recovery in only very limited circumstances.
Three factors emerge from the categories as essential requirements for a
successful public disclosure action: (1) the fact must be one not voluntarily
disclosed; (2) it must not concern governmental authorities or the occur-
rence of crime; and (3) it must concern a matter that would be embarrassing
or demeaning to a reasonable person. Under current judicial thinking the
plaintiff must, as a minimum, establish these elements to recover for public
disclosure of private fact. As will be seen, however, this does not guarantee
recovery. Even in cases in which these factors are present, the courts have
been conservative in their approach to public disclosure cases.
This conservatism can be justified on several grounds. Some of the cases
undeniably represent bogus or frivolous claims. 248 Another concern is that
more liberal application may undermine freedom of speech as guaranteed by
the first amendment. The premise of a public disclosure claim is that the
disclosed information is true.249 Courts may justifiably be concerned about
241. Howley v. Professional Credit Bureau, Inc., 345 Mich. 500, 76 N.W.2d 835, 838
(1956); Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 154, 327 A.2d 133, 137-38 (1974); see Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Moten, 27 Ariz. App. 759, 558 P.2d 954, 958 (1976).
242. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 774, 299 S.W. 967, 971 (1927).
243. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment a.
244. Mikel v. Abrams, 541 F. Supp. 591, 597 (W.D. Mo. 1982).
245. Beaumont v. Brown, 401 Mich. 80, 257 N.W.2d 522, 531 (1977).
246. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 161-88 and accompanying text.
248. See Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1950); Cefalu v. Globe News-
paper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 391 N.E.2d 935 (1979).
249. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
11771985]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
imposing liability for the dissemination of true information. 250 Courts may
also discount these claims as the inevitable price one pays for living in a give-
and-take society.251
Even in a give-and-take society, however, the individual should be allowed
to keep certain matters concealed to himself. Such matters should be
deemed public material only when he voluntarily allows them to become so.
The notion of a voluntary exposure is the basis for many of the cases holding
for defendants. The idea is directly applicable in some cases;25 2 in others,
such as location cases, the courts infer voluntary exposure; 25 3 while in yet
other cases, courts use the notion in ways that seem dubious, such as in some
of the public-figure cases. 25 4
Voluntariness also plays a large role in other cases in which the idea is
scarcely, if at all, mentioned. The plaintiff's involuntary position might ex-
plain much of the outcome in cases in which the disclosure is found to be
indecent. 255 Perhaps this is why publishing photographs of a person suffer-
ing physical disfigurement is actionable;2 56 a person's disfigurement is usu-
ally not voluntarily acquired or disclosed.
Voluntariness might also explain the difference in outcome between Neff v.
Time, Inc. 257 and Daily Times Democrat v. Graham.258 These two cases
were similar in the subject matter of the disclosure. In Neff the disclosure
was the unzipped fly of an inebriated sports fan's trousers; the plaintiff in
Graham was photographed while her skirt was unexpectedly raised by air
jets in a carnival fun house. If the two courts had been faithful to the loca-
tion analysis used by most courts, the results in both cases would have been
for the defendants. While Neff predictably held for the defendant, Graham
held for the plaintiff, acknowledging the location rule, but rejecting it as
arbitrary and unfair. 259
The Graham court apparently felt that location should at most be only a
factor in determining voluntariness. But Graham is an anomaly. Most
250. See Bezanson, supra note 157, at 1079-80; Swan, supra note 199, at 508-09; Comment,
supra note 158, at 181; Comment, An Accommodation of Privacy Interests and First Amend-
ment Rights in Public Disclosure Cases, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 1385, 1407-08 (1976).
251. Carlisle v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 201 Cal. App. 3d 733, 20 Cal. Rptr. 405, 415-16
(1962) (quoting Davis v. General Fin. & Thrift Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225, 227
(1950)).
252. See supra notes 19-21 and accompanying text.
253. See supra notes 22-44 and accompanying text.
254. See Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 688, 50 So. 2d 391, 393 (1951), in which the Missis-
sippi Supreme Court stated: "[O]ne who engages in public affairs and public life to an extent
which draws the public interest upon him may be deemed to have consented to the publication
of his name and photograph in connection with a legitimate news story .... " Accord Corliss
v. E.W. Walker Co., 64 F. 280, 282 (D. Mass. 1894); Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App. 2d 704, 211
P.2d 320, 321 (1949); Wilson v. Brown, 189 Misc. 79, 73 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589 (Sup. Ct. 1947).
255. See Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610, 615 (1969).
256. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
257. 406 F. Supp. 858 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
258. 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964).
259. 162 So. 2d at 478.
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courts have placed much heavier emphasis on the event's location, 260 and at
least one of the opinions includes language that describes location as conclu-
sive.261 These courts apparently disagree with the Graham court and believe
that a person does indeed forfeit his right of privacy merely because he was
temporarily part of a public setting. The essential attitude is arguably the
same, however. Consent and voluntariness are the basic consideration, but
whereas most courts see these in virtually any public appearance, the Gra-
ham court was more discerning.
The courts have consistently rejected plaintiffs' claims in cases involving
governmental activity. These cases most often arise in the context of the
occurrence or prosecution of crime262 and in accounts involving political
leaders. 26 3 Courts regard seriously the need to oversee our governmental
authorities, an interest important enough in our self-governing society to
sweep aside the claims of many persons who are only indirectly involved,
particularly in cases involving criminal matters. One who attempts to rescue
a murder victim, for example, becomes the proper subject of publicity,264 as
do criminal victims, 2 6 5 the erroneously accused, 266 and innocent bystand-
ers.267 The procedures of the criminal process, such as parole268 or trial,269
are subject to publicity. The media have a free rein in reporting crime, in-
cluding the right to identify nearly everyone involved 270 and to publish mat-
ters that are certain to be distressing. Even a photograph of a mangled
corpse, complete with identification, is proper in describing a murder. 27 1
For a fact to be a private one, therefore, it must be unrelated to the occur-
rence of crime.
The fact must also be unrelated to persons who hold government posi-
tions, such as police judges,272 housing inspectors,27 3 police officers,274 and
military officers.2 75 The license is a broad one, allowing publicity of all in-
volved, either directly or indirectly. One court, for example, has allowed a
description of a political candidate's delinquent children.2 76  Whether
couched in terms of public figure, newsworthiness, or consent, the cases indi-
260. E.g., Gill v. Hearst Publishing Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 253 P.2d 441, 443-44 (1953);
Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1979).
261. See Cefalu v. Globe Newspaper Co., 8 Mass. App. Ct. 71, 391 N.E.2d 935, 939 (1979).
262. See supra notes 114-18, 127-36, and accompanying texts.
263. See Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
264. Jones v. Herald Post Co., 230 Ky. 227, 18 S.W.2d 972, 972-73 (1929).
265. See supra notes 130-33 and accompanying text.
266. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
267. Jacova v. Southern Radio & Television, 83 So. 2d 34, 35-40 (Fla. 1955).
268. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
270. See supra notes 127-40 and accompanying text. One possible exception is represented
by cases in which substantial time has elapsed since the conviction. See supra note 221 and
accompanying text.
271. Abernathy v. Thornton, 263 Ala. 496, 83 So. 2d 235, 238 (1955); Waters v. Fleet-
wood, 212 Ga. 161, 91 S.E.2d 344, 348 (1956).
272. Bell v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co., 402 S.W.2d 84 (Ky. 1966).
273. Harnish v. Herald-Mail Co., 264 Md. 326, 286 A.2d 146 (1972).
274. See supra note 110 and cases cited therein.
275. Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp., 108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951).
276. Kapellas v. Kofman, I Cal. 3d 20, 459 P.2d 912, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360 (1969).
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cate a clear judicial willingness to allow publication of matters pertaining to
the lives of government officials.
2 77
In the words of the Restatement, liability for a public disclosure will result
only if the disclosed matter "would be highly offensive to a reasonable per-
son."2 78 This is probably the most elusive element of the tort and is made
more difficult to delineate by the infrequency with which courts have di-
rectly dealt with it. If the disclosed matter is of legitimate public concern,
no liability results, even if the matter is otherwise highly offensive. Because
so many cases have come out for the defendant based on the public interest,
obviating the need to consider the meaning of "highly offensive," very little
data are available from which to derive a definition. If the publicity con-
cerns either government officials or criminal matters, the publisher will gen-
erally not be liable, despite the offensiveness of the publicity. The
voluntariness of a public appearance also renders irrelevant the offensiveness
of a disclosure. 279
Nonetheless, the publicity must be embarrassing and demeaning for liabil-
ity to result. Virtually all of the few cases favoring plaintiffs have concerned
a matter embarrassing or demeaning to the plaintiff, whether it be his
nudity, 280 deformed body,28' embarrassing disease, 282 or debt status. 28 3 No
liability results from publicity that is favorable or complimentary, because
such publicity normally would not be embarrassing or demeaning. 28 4 Many
cases decided for the defendant on the basis of newsworthiness could also
have been decided on the basis that no demeaning or embarrassing exposure
was made of the plaintiff.28 5
The significance of these three factors can particularly be seen in the hand-
ful of cases holding for the plaintiff. All three factors are present in each of
these cases, with the exception of the cases that involve rehabilitated
277. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text; cf Stryker v. Republic Pictures Corp.,
108 Cal. App. 2d 191, 238 P.2d 670 (1951) (military personnel subject only their military lives
to public scrutiny as compared to candidates for public office, whose complete privacy may be
forfeited). The need to oversee governmental authorities has led some courts to allow publicity
of virtually anything that appears on a public record. See supra notes 161-88 and accompany-
ing text. Whether because of this policy, or because information contained in a public record
is "already publicly known," the courts generally held for defendants in cases involving the
disclosure of such information. See supra note 188 and accompanying text. Both rationales
have become legal fictions that support a nearly automatic rule: if the information is on a
public record, then it is publishable without liability. This rule applies even if the information
serves no government-checking function and even if the information, although publicly avail-
able, is not truly "already publicly known."
278. RESTATEMENT, supra note 1, § 652D comment c.
279. Neff v. Time, Inc., 406 F. Supp. 858, 862 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
280. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
282. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
283. See Roberts v. McKee, 29 Ga. 161 (1859); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W.
967 (1927). But see Hendry v. Conner, 308 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d 921 (1975) (debt status
publishable).
284. See supra notes 227-33 and accompanying text.
285. See supra notes 143-46 and accompanying text. Although distressing, the publicity in
these cases could not be termed embarrassing or demeaning.
[Vol. 381180
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE CLAIMS
criminals, in which the passage of time is a key factor.286 These factors,
however, can only be regarded as minimum requirements. Not all courts are
persuaded by their significance; the factors are present in many cases in
which courts nevertheless hold for defendants. Two particular examples are
Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune Co.287 and Meetze v. Associated
Press.288
III. A BRIEFLY STATED SUGGESTION
If the goal of Warren and Brandeis was to create an effective remedy for
unreasonably offensive publicity, their goal remains unaccomplished. From
the Warren-Brandeis point of view, the public disclosure tort has thus far
proven to be a failure. According to one writer's count, fewer than eighteen
public disclosure cases have favored plaintiffs over the years. 289 Many of the
majority are affirmances of summary judgments for defendants, cases in
which juries were not allowed to make their input. Many claims have surely
been bogus or trivial, and others probably represent unsure efforts by plain-
tiffs' attorneys to explore an uncharted course. But the scarcity of holdings
favoring plaintiffs also suggests a strong judicial distaste for claims of unjus-
tified public disclosure and an indisposition to support such claims.
If ever a plaintiff could justifiably have been distressed by personal public-
ity, it was Robbin Howard in Howard v. Des Moines Register & Tribune
Co. 290 While confined to a county home, she was involuntary sterilized as a
precondition to being released. For six years afterward she lived a normal
life and established friendships with people who were unaware of the sterili-
zation. This situation changed, however, when a Des Moines newspaper
published an article describing questionable practices and patient abuse at
the home. The article highlighted Howard's sterilization as an example and
identified her by name. Howard's petition claimed that she incurred con-
tempt and ridicule because of the publicity and suffered mental pain and
anguish. The matter was involuntary, embarrassing, and demeaning to
Howard, noncriminal, and only indirectly concerned with political figures.
The trial court did not allow the jury to consider the case, granting the news-
paper's motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court of Iowa af-
firmed, employing some of the categories described in Part I of this Article
as the basis for its decision. 29' The court said that the entire episode, includ-
ing the identification of the plaintiff, was a matter of public record 292 and
newsworthy. 293 The plaintiff was left with no remedy.
The young couple in Meetze v. Associated Press294 also had their private
286. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
287. 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979).
288. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
289. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 293 n.5.
290. 283 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 1979).
291. Id. at 299-303.
292. Id. at 299-300.
293. Id. at 302-03.
294. 230 S.C. 330, 95 S.E.2d 606 (1956).
19851 1181
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
lives disturbed by a newspaper article. The article described the personal
and intimate occasion of the birth of their son. Despite their consistent en-
treaties and precautions to limit publicity, the defendant published an article
publicizing the birth and highlighting a fact that was certain to attract the
readers' attention-the age of the mother, who was twelve years old when
the child was born. As a result of the publication, the young mother alleg-
edly became an object of scorn and ridicule and suffered "extreme embar-
rassment, humiliation, mental anguish, mental agony, wounded feelings and
loss of privacy." 295 As in Howard, the matter was noncriminal, nonpolitical,
not voluntarily disclosed, and embarrassing and demeaning to the plaintiff.
The trial court, however, sustained the defendant's demurrer, and the
Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed. 296 The court relied principally
on the same two grounds as did the Howard court: the newsworthiness of
the birth 297 and the fact that the information was contained in a public
record.298
In its discussion of each of these two points, the Meetze court displayed a
disregard for the privacy claim. 299 In discussing newsworthiness the court
remarked that the birth ,of a child to a twelve-year-old girl was rather unu-
sual and gave as the primary rationale for its conclusion that the birth was a
biological event that would naturally raise public interest.30° Under this
view the question of privacy is removed from considerations of normative
value or policy consideration and becomes subject to popular inquisitiveness.
If enough people would be curious about the matter, then it is not private
and no liability results from publicizing it. The court did not assess public
need, 30 1 nor did it consider whether the information was important to the
government-checking process. In commenting on the public records idea,
the court acknowledged that the article was published before the birth certif-
icate was fled, but stated that this was of little significance, since a person
has no claim of privacy in something that could not, by operation of law,
remain private.3 0 2 To invoke the public records rule, therefore, the defend-
ant need only argue that the matter will, in the future, appear on a public
record.
If the Howard and Meetze decisions were isolated occurrences, they would
be notable but not significant. These two cases, however, are representative
of a general judicial distaste for privacy claims. Many courts have relied on
artful and narrow device and theory to circumvent the public disclosure tort,
often preventing juries from considering the question. If a public disclosure
tort is to exist at all, this approach is unwarranted. If the courts are truly
295. 95 S.E.2d at 608.
296. Id. at 610-11.




301. Cf Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474, 477 (1964). The
court in Graham stated that the defendant's photographs of the plaintiff disclosed nothing
about which the'public had a right to be informed.
302. 95 S.E.2d at 610.
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interested in protecting against unreasonable publicity, the approach is self-
defeating.
A better approach would be for the courts to consider a more general
question: whether the reasonable person would have expectations of privacy
in the matter publicized by the defendant. This general approach has long-
established parallels in other areas of tort law. To establish an assault, for
example, the plaintiff must show that he was reasonably apprehensive of a
physical contact.303 The entire field of negligence is unified by a single, gen-
eral inquiry, which asks whether the defendant acted as a reasonable person
under the circumstances. 30 4
A recent example of such an approach comes from a Connecticut trial
court. In Rafferty v. Hartford Courant Co. 30 5 the plaintiffs, both recently
divorced, staged a bizarre "unwedding ceremony" to celebrate their di-
vorces. The defendant newspaper's reporter and photographer recorded the
event, and their story and photograph later appeared in the defendant's
newspaper. As a result the plaintiffs suffered "extreme mental anguish," and
one of them was forced to leave his job.
The court ultimately rejected the newspaper's motion for summary judg-
ment, saying that questions of fact existed as to the scope of the reporter's
invitation. 30 6 The court made no reference to any of the traditional catego-
ries. 307 The court instead said that questions existed as to the motive and
intent in the extension of the invitation to the reporter; the fair and honest,
but subjective, feelings of the reporter and his reactions to the invitation; and
the reactions of the witnesses to the ceremony itself.30 8 The issue had been
raised as to whether everyone in attendance had agreed that no one would
report the party, as alleged in the plaintiff's affidavit. 309 All of these factors
approach a discussion of consent, but more accurately can be described as a
consideration of the reasonable expectations of all the persons involved: the
plaintiffs, the reporter, the photographer, and the guests. The plaintiffs al-
legedly intended their behavior to be viewed privately, 310 and the jury's re-
sponsibility was to determine whether this expectation was reasonable and
justifiable. The court's opinion is in contrast to the cases discussed in Part I,
in which such considerations were seldom, if ever, raised. 31'
The general test proposed need not be inconsistent with the ideas de-
303. W. PROSSER, supra note 17, § 10.
304. Id. § 32.
305. 36 Conn. Supp. 239, 416 A.2d 1215 (Super. Ct. 1980).
306. 416 A.2d at 1220.
307. The court could have emphasized the location of the event, which took place on an
open hillside, but in an area that was private and some distance from passers-by. Id. at 1216.
308. Id. at 1221.
309. Id. at 1220.
310. Id. at 1216.
311. See Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964). The
court in Graham stated:
One who is a part of a public scene may be lawfully photographed as an inciden-
tal part of that scene in his ordinary status. Where the status he expects to
occupy is changed without his volition to a status embarrassing to an ordinary
person of reasonable sensitivity, then he should not be deemed to have forfeited
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scribed in Part I. A truly public figure, for example, probably has lower
expectations of privacy and, therefore, would face a higher burden in recov-
ering for unwanted publicity under the proposed test. Many of the cases
described in Part I would reach the same result under a general test. The
proposed test still has value, however. A unifying theme would promote
consistency of results and allow courts and juries to base decisions on a
firmer, more thoughtful, and less arbitrary foundation. A more general test
would help to avoid questionable decisions such as Meetze and Howard,
which resulted from uncritical loyalty to the established categories.
Courts currently dispose of many public disclosure cases by summary
judgment, untouched by jury consideration. The importance of the jury
would obviously be greater under a more flexible standard that considers
reasonable expectations. A jury would be able, more so than a judge, to
determine whether a reasonable person would have expectations of privacy
in a certain matter. The jury's discretion should, therefore, be accorded
great weight, summary judgments should be rare, and appellate courts
should reverse only in limited circumstances.
IV. CONCLUSION
The courts have developed a variety of methods to deal with public disclo-
sure cases. Some of these have become hard-and-fast rules, and all have
developed into pro-defendant standards. The result is that the tort of public
disclosure has failed in its initial purpose of providing a remedy for unrea-
sonable publicity. It has indeed become a phantom tort.31 2
Our society continues to regard privacy as a valuable interest worth pre-
serving. Protection from unwanted and unreasonable publicity remains a
worthwhile goal achievable by legal doctrine. One writer has suggested
otherwise, stating that "[p]erhaps the best defense against the effects of pub-
lic gossip is a willingness to be more discreet in revealing personal informa-
tion about ourselves and in exposing our intimate behaviour to public
view. "313 She quoted the Younger Committee's conclusions 3 14 that
"guarded speech about one's personal affairs, care of personal papers, cau-
tion in disclosing information on request, confining private conduct to se-
cluded places, and the use of curtains, shutters and frosted glass" are
effective to protect privacy. 31 5 She further suggested that the public disclo-
sure tort is a "leaky ship which should at long last be scuttled. '31 6
The Committee's alternatives, however, only demonstrate the need for a
his right to be protected from an indecent and vulgar intrusion of his right of
privacy merely because misfortune overtakes him in a public place.
162 So. 2d at 478.
312. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 362 (citing A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 7, 346-
50 (1967)).
313. Zimmerman, supra note 4, at 364.
314. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PRIVACY, CMD 5, No. 5012 (1972) [frequently
referred to as the Younger Committee Report]. The British Government established the
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legal measure. The solution is not to scuttle the public disclosure tort, but to
resurrect it. Courts need not abandon the theories that have emerged over
the years, but they should employ them more critically, perhaps as impor-
tant considerations rather than as dispositive rules, all with a view to an-
swering a basic and overarching question: whether the plaintiff had a rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the disclosed item. Such an approach
would afford a fair and reasonable soundness to a much-needed legal
remedy.

